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Abstract:  The paper considers  two  categories of discrimination:  "discrimination against"  and 
"discrimination in favor",  which Becker coins "nepotism". The paper develops an experimental 
test  to  distinguish  between  these  two  types  of discrimination.  The  experiment  compares  the 
behavior  towards  individuals  of  different  groups  with  the  behavior  towards  anonymous 
individuals  (those  having  no  clear  group  affiliation).  We  illustrate  the  two  attitudes  by 
considering two  segmented societies:  Belgian society, with its linguistic segmentation between 
the Flemish and the Walloons, and Israeli society,  where we focus on  religious versus  secular 
segmentation. In Belgium, we find evidence of discrimination against. Both the Walloons and the 
Flemish  treat  people  of their  own  group  in  the  same  way  as  anonymous  individuals  while 
discriminating against individuals of the other group. In contrast, the behavior of ultra-orthodox 
religious Jews in Israel can be categorized as nepotism: they favor members of their own group 
while  treating anonymous individuals  in  the  same  way  as  secular individuals.  The distinction 
between the different types of discrimination is important in evaluating the effectiveness and the 
efficiency consequences of anti-discriminatory legislations. 
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Discrimination is defined as  differential treatment of people depending on their 
group  affiliation.  Fighting  discrimination  presents  a  definite  challenge  to  societies 
interested  in  doing  so.  Whereas  legislation  prohibiting  differential  treatment  may  be 
effective in situations in which discrimination is observable and verifiable, it has limited 
effect whenever the phenomenon cannot be directly observed, for instance, in informal 
business relationships, when applying for bank loans, or in student-teacher relationships 
in the classroom. 
To restrict the impact of discrimination, societies often adopt different forms  of 
anonymity rules that impose a procedure prohibiting disclosure of group affiliation.! Such 
a rule may imply, for example, that grading of students be performed while maintaining 
the  students  anonymity,  that  is,  without revealing  their  gender  or  ethnic  background. 
Different forms of anonymity rules, in which individuals are forbidden to  disclose their 
group affiliation when applying for jobs, loans, school admission and so forth, are applied 
in  many  societies.  By  avoiding  identification  of group  affiliation,  it  is  assumed that 
uniform treatment will  naturally result? In the USA, for example, title VII of the 1964 
civil Rights Act does not prohibit employers from asking questions about race, color, and 
the like3,  while equal employment laws enacted by many states explicitly prohibit such 
1  The aim of some policies is to fight discrimination while other policies are corrective in that they try to 
overturn the outcome of  discrimination without challenging the phenomenon itself. 
2  This is true in societies in which there are no other forms of group signalling such as names or place of 
residence. 
3 Such questions may nonetheless serve as evidence for unlawful discrimination. pre-employment inquiries (see for example West Virginia law: W.  Va.  Code section 5-11-
9(2) (A)). 
Anonymity rules or procedures may also be voluntarily adopted by organizations 
that wish to reduce the impact of discrimination. In a recent article Goldin and Rouse 
(2000) describes the impact of "blind" auditions of musicians by top US  orchestras. The 
paper shows that the use of such a procedure greatly enhances the likelihood that a female 
contestant will be the winner in a final round. The blind audition procedure is similar to 
the  "double-blind"  refereeing  procedure  that  is  adopted  by many  academic  journals. 
Blank (1991) analyzed the effects of such a procedure on the pattern of refereeing on the 
American Economic Review. 
The main motivation for  fighting discrimination is  clearly moral,  based on the 
wish to live in a society in which people are not treated differentially according to their 
group or ethnic affiliation. But anti-discrimination policies may introduce various equity-
efficiency tradeoffs that could depend on the type of the  discriminatory behavior.4 For 
example, statistical discrimination,  as  defined by Arrow (1973) and Phelps (1972), is  a 
situation in which the members of different groups are treated differently in response to 
statistical differences in their characteristics or behavior. In such cases the anonymity rule 
may be inefficient as it disallows the use of relevant statistical information.5 Nevertheless, 
4  Schotter  and Weigelt  (1992)  adopted  an  experimental  approach  to  consider the  efficiency  costs  of 
affirmative action and equal opportunity laws. Their main result is that the imposition of such programs may 
enhance efficiency and not just equity, thus avoiding the equity/efficiency tradeoff. 
5 For example, we would have more efficient insurance schedules if we allowed them to be conditional on 
all known characteristics of  the different groups in a society. 
2 societies are often intolerant of statistical discrimination even if it implies an efficiency 
When there is  a taste for discrimination  (see  Becker (1957)),  ethnic  affiliation 
does not provide any relevant statistical information and discrimination is based entirely 
on discriminatory preferences. Such preferences may affect market behavior and thus may 
induce efficiency consequences. The application of anonymity rules thus may eliminate 
discrimination, but to evaluate their efficiency outcome it is necessary to examine what 
type of discrimination or group bias is in effect. 
The emphasis in the definition of discrimination is on the relative terms. That is, 
the  differential treatment of individuals based on their group  membership. If someone 
treats  members  of group  A better than  members  of group  B  then,  by  definition,  she 
discriminates against members of group B.  However in principle one can  distinguish 
between "discriminate against", which captures the disutility caused by associating with 
someone,  and  "discrimination  in  favor"  which  implies  on  non-monetary  gains  from 
associating with an individual of a particular group. Becker (1957, p.7), who first made 
this distinction, defines "discrimination in favor" as nepotism. Becker then argues that the 
reason we hear so  little about nepotism is  that it is empirically indistinguishable from 
discrimination against,  and  "the social and economic implications of  positive prejudice 
6 For example, most societies do not allow conditioning health insurance on individuals' ethnic origin. But 
in setting car insurance rates, it is acceptable to use relevant information regarding the driver' age, although 
it  is  not  acceptable  to  practice  similar  statistical  discrimination  on  the  basis  of  other  individual 
characteristics such as gender. 
3 ,-.- nepotism are very similar to  those of  negative prejudice or discrimination" (Becker 
1957, p.7).7 
The  distinction  between  discrimination  against  and  nepotism  is  part  of  the 
experimental  design  suggested  in  this  paper.  Before  turning  to  a  description  of our 
experiment, we need to redefine these concepts in terms of behavior rather than in terms 
of preferences. We consider the interaction between players of two  different groups  in 
two  situations;  when  group  identity  is  fully  observable,  and  when  one  player  is  an 
anonymous  player  whose  group  affiliation  is  unknown  to  the  other.  By  comparing 
behavior  under  full  observability  with  behavior  under  anonymity,  it  is  possible  to 
distinguish  between  discrimination  against  and  nepotism.8  We  define  "discrimination 
against"  as  the  behavior  displayed  when  individuals  treat  anonymous  individuals 
positively,  as they  would treat members of their own group,  and treat members  from 
another group negatively. On the other hand,  "nepotism" characterizes situations where 
players  treat  identically  (and  negatively)  anonymous  players  and  members  of other 
groups, while favorably treating identified members of their own groUp.9 
The  distinction  between  discrimination  and  nepotism  has  important  policy 
implications. Consider for example a market in which interpersonal trust or cooperation is 
needed in order to achieve higher overall payoffs. When there is discrimination against, 
players will trust or cooperate with an anonymous player as if he were a member of their 
7 However considering the two types of  discrimination in a labor market context and allowing for entry and 
exit of  firms, yields that in the long run nepotism survives while discrimination does not, see Becker second 
edition (1971, ft 4, page 44) and a discussion in Weiss (200  1). 
8  Becker's definition, which is stated in terms of utility, and our behavioral definition are not equivalent; 
see the discussion in the next section. 
9 Clearly these are just the two extreme situations. One can conceive of intermediate scenarios in which the 
differential treatment is the outcome of  a combination of  discrimination against and nepotism. 
4 own group. In such a case, use of the anonymity rule, may promote efficiency in addition 
to equity. However, using the anonymity rule to combat nepotism will promote equity, 
but may also reduce overall trust and cooperation and thereby reduce the overall surplus 
to be divided between the players.  On the other hand when favorable treatment reduces 
the  overall  pie the  above  conclusion is  reversed  and  the  use  of an  anonymity rule  in 
situations of discrimination against will be subject to an equity/efficiency tradeoff. 
To illustrate  the  differences  between  discrimination  against  and  nepotism  we 
present two experiments that were conducted in Belgium and Israel.  We  use the  trust 
game  (see  Berg,  Dickhaut,  and McCabe  (1995»  because in this  game,  discrimination 
directly  affects  the  total  surplus  to  be  divided between the  players;  hence,  the  equity-
efficiency tradeoff is transparent. 
Belgian  society  is  linguistically  segmented  between  Flemish  and  Walloons, 
whereas in Israel we  focus  on  the religious versus secular segmentation.JO  Specifically, 
Belgian  society  is  divided  between  the  Walloon  (33%)  and  the  Flemish  (58%) 
communities.  The  division  is  also  geographic,  with  most  universities,  for  example, 
affiliated with one group or the other. In order to conduct the experiment, we chose four 
universities:  two Flemish and two Walloon.  We let players from a Walloon university 
play the trust game with players from another Walloon university and with players of a 
Flemish university. In some of the forms in the experiment we revealed the group identity 
of the  opponent  (his/her  university),  while  in  other  forms  we  did  not  reveal  this 
information  (anonymity).  We  repeated  this  procedure  with  players  from  one  of the 
10 See Fershtman and Gneezy (2001) for an experimental study on ethnic segmentation in the Israeli society. 
5 Flemish universities. We then  compared the players'  strategies in  order to examine the 
effect of group affiliation and the anonymity rule on the players' actions. 
A similar experimental  design  was  adopted in the  experiment we  conducted in 
Israel. Approximately 9% of the Jewish population in Israel is ultra-orthodoxY Since the 
ultra-orthodox Jewish population has a completely separate education system, schooling 
is  a perfect signal for group affiliation. We let players from a religious  (ultra-orthodox) 
college play the trust game with players from another religious (ultra-orthodox) college, 
with players from a secular school,  and with "anonymous" players. We  then compared 
their actions in the three different cases. 12 
In  the  two societies that we  studied,  players' basic behavior reflected a similar 
pattern: each player preferred players from hislher own group. However, our experiment 
indicated  that  discrimination  in  the  context  of the  WalloonlFlemish  segmentation  in 
Belgium can  be  characterized as  "discrimination  against"  while  discrimination  in  the 
context  of  ultra  orthodox/secular  segmentation  in  Israel  can  be  characterized  as 
"nepotism."  Consequently,  while  the  anonymity  rule  may  promote  both  equity  and 
efficiency in  the  Belgian  society,  a  similar  policy  in  Israel  will  intensify  the  equity-
efficiency tradeoff. 
11  The ultra-orthodox Jewish group is fragmented into groups with complex, sometimes rivalries, relations. 
12  Since the  small  percentage of ultra-orthodox  in  the population may affect their perception about  the 
identity of anonymous players, we conducted two  versions of this experiment. In the first one, we did not 
reveal group identity; in such a case beliefs may coincide with the sectoral distribution in the population. In 
the second, we stated that the probability of an anonymous player being from either of the two schools was 
50%. 
6 2. Discrimination Against vs. Nepotism. 
Two related phenomena may explain discriminatory behavior. The first is group 
stereotyping,  situations  in  which  there  are commonly held beliefs in  a population that 
members  of a  certain  group  may  have  some  shared  characteristics  that  affect  their 
behavior or their abilities. Such stereotypes may be correct, or incorrect. When the group 
stereotyping is correct the discriminatory behavior is denoted as statistical discrimination. 
When this pattern applies, people may be discriminated against due to their ethnicity or 
race, as a result of some common beliefs regarding characteristics or abilities, but no role 
is played by emotions such as  "hate" or "love." That is,  discrimination in such cases is 
not  the  outcome  of  discriminatory  preferences.13  The  second  explanation  for 
discriminatory behavior involves discriminatory preferences, denoted by Becker (1957) as 
a "taste for discrimination". In this type of discrimination, people simply like or dislike 
members of another group. For example, workers with such a preference may "suffer" if 
they  work  with  workers  from  the  other  group  and  are  willing  to  sacrifice  monetary 
payoffs in order to avoid associating with people from the other group. Note that there is 
a difference between the phenomena of group  stereotyping and taste for  discrimination 
although  they  both  may yield  similar behavior.  Stereotyping may  likewise imply that 
people will  be  willing to  make  monetary sacrifices  in order not  to  be associated with 
players of specific groupS.14 But this is not because they do not like them but because they 
have certain beliefs about their characteristics or behavior. Discrimination based on taste 
13  Even when  a group  stereotype  is  correct, this  does  not mean that  as  a society we  would allow such 
discrimination. But the exact rule as to what to  allow and what to prohibit clearly depends on a society's 
culture and moral values. 
14 Clearly, positive stereotypes are possible. In such a case, people will be willing to  ''pay'' in order to be 
associated with members of the positive stereotyped group. 
7 does not have to  involve stereotypes or beliefs, it can simply reflect a general dislike of 
certain groups. 
Taste for  discrimination  can be  defined in terms  limiting to  liking or  disliking 
members of other groups. Discrimination against captures situations where people do not 
like to be associated with members of the other group and they are willing to pay in order 
to avoid contact. In contrast, nepotism refers to situations where people want to associate 
with members of the other group and are thus willing to pay for the opportunity. While 
these distinctions were made by Becker (1957), they have hardly been used since, as the 
two phenomena are empirically indistinguishable. As Becker noted in the summary of his 
book:  "a theory based on  "hatred" of  one group is not easily distinguished empirically 
from one based on "love" of  the other group" (Becker 1957, p.129). 
The definitions  of discrimination against and  nepotism  that we  propose in this 
paper are based on observed behavior. Classification is based on behavior towards players 
with observable group affiliation versus behavior towards anonymous players. Consider a 
society consisting of two  groups of players,  A and B.  When players of group  A treat 
players of their own group better than they treat players of group B, but treat anonymous 
players in the same way that they treat players of group  A,  we denote this behavior as 
discrimination against members of group B.  In this case, members of group B are badly 
treated only when they are  identified as  such. Alternatively, if players of group A treat 
anonymous players in the same way that they treat members of group B,  we denote this 
behavior  as  nepotism.  In  such  a  case,  players  treat  members  of group  A  favorably 
whenever they are  able to identify them.  Clearly, these  are the two extreme cases. One 
8 can think of numerous intennediate cases. In such instances we can only detennine if the 
discrimination is closer to nepotism or to discrimination against. 
Our behavioral definitions of discrimination against and nepotism diverge from 
Becker's  (1957)  preference-based  definition.  Clearly,  when  players  have  nepotistic 
preferences  with  respect  to  members  of group  A,  they  will  treat anonymous  players 
favorably as they may assume that these players may also be from group A. The degree of 
favoritism in such a case may depend on their belief regarding the group identity of the 
anonymous  player. 15  A  similar  argument  can  be made  with  respect to  discrimination 
against. But in such a case, as was argued by Becker, nepotism and discrimination against 
are  not  empirically  distinguishable.  We  thus  adopted  a  more  restrictive  definition, 
requiring that behavior be tenned nepotism when players  treat other players  favorably 
only when they clearly identify them as members of group A (the favored group).  While 
this definition seems restrictive it is consistent with the pattern of discrimination in the 
two societies that we studied and report in this paper. 
When group A is a small minority of the population, players facing an anonymous 
player can rationally conclude that this anonymous player is most probably from group B, 
and  will  treat him  accordingly.  While this pattern of behavior is  also  interesting, the 
behavior that we consider in this paper is more general. In order to address this issue, we 
made the following variation in our experiment. In the experiment that we conducted with 
ultra-orthodox Jews in Israel, we had two treatments. In the first one, we let participants 
15  For players  with  rational  expectations,  these  beliefs  should be  identical  to  the  actual  distribution of 
players in the population.  We did not ask subjects about their beliefs since elicitation procedures trigger 
cognitive processes that may bias the reply. It is important to note that in the context of our study, however, 
it does  not matter what  triggers  the behavior--beliefs or preferences--since  we  focus  on  the comparison 
9 play against anonymous players from  the  entire  popu~ation. Because the ultra-orthodox 
group consists of only 9%  of the population in Israel, the players probably believed that 
the anonymous player was a secular player. In such a case, their nepotistic behavior was 
not  surprising;  they treated  the  anonymous  player  as  if he is  a  secular player.  In the 
second treatment,  we  let  the  ultra-orthodox  players  play  against an  anonymous  player 
after stating that there was a 50% probability that the anonymous player belonged to their 
own  ultra-orthodox  group,  and  a  50%  probability  of being  secular.  Surprisingly,  the 
nepotistic behavior remained constant in the  second treatment, which indicates that our 
definitions of pure nepotistic or discriminatory behavior are not restricted to situations in 
which the statistical inference is that the anonymous player most probably belongs to one 
or another groups. 
The  distinction between  discrimination  against  and nepotism  is  not considered 
just for the sake of conceptual classification as it may have policy implications. The focus 
in  this paper is  on the efficiency consequences  of an  anonymity rule.  To illustrate the 
equity/efficiency tradeoff, we choose to conduct our experiment using the trust game as in 
this game, "better treatment" of individuals yields a larger overall pie for the two players. 
The trust game was introduced by Berg, Dickhaut, and McCabe (1995). The game 
involves two  players,  A and B. At the first  stage, player A is given  a fixed amount of 
money and is  asked to decide  whether to  transfer part of it to  Player B.  The  amount 
transferred is automatically tripled, and player B then needs to decide how much he wants 
to transfer back to player A. The efficient outcome, which maximizes the total pie, would 
between  behavior  towards  an  anonymous  player  versus  behavior  towards  players  witb  clear  group 
affiliation. 
10 require player A to transfer all his resources to player B (as these resources would then be 
tripled). The subgame perfect equilibrium, on the other hand,  implies no transfers. The 
outcomes of the  experiment are typically different from  this equilibrium.  Berg et al.'s 
experiment confirmed that Player A typically sends a positive amount of money to Player 
B,  who often returns  an  even  larger amount.16  The amount that player A  transfers  to 
player B serves, in such an experiment, as  an indication of trust or cooperation between 
the  two players.  Thus  whenever  a player is  more trusted  or whenever  there  is  more 
cooperation between players, the overall pie is larger. 
In the trust game, the use of an anonymity rule to eliminate nepotism may promote 
equity, but it may also reduce overall gains (efficiency). However, one may also consider 
different classes of games in which favorable treatment reduces overall gains (although it 
may redistribute those gains between players). In such games,  the use of an anonymity 
rule to eliminate nepotism may introduce the equity/efficiency tradeoff, while the use of 
such a policy to fight discrimination against may be both efficient and equity enhancing. 
3. ''Discrimination Against" and the inefficiency of the anonymity rule. 
3.1  The Walloons and the Flemish: A Short Background on Ethnic Segmentation in 
Belgium 
The Belgian State may be divided into three different regions: 
•  Flanders, located in the North, containing 58% of the population; 
16  A similar,  less  stylized  procedure  was  used  by  Fehr,  Kirchsteiger,  and  Riedel  (1993)  and  by  Fehr, 
Gachter,  and  Kirchsteiger  (1997).  A  comparable  experimental  study  was  also  conducted  by  Guth, 
Ockenfels, and Wendel (1994). 
11 •  Wallonia, located in the South, containing 33% of the population 
•  Brussels, located in the center, containing 9% of the population. 
For simplicity, one may categorize the Belgian population into two main groups, 
according to  the language spoken: the Flemish (Dutch speaking) populate Flanders and 
form a minority in Brussels (20%); the Walloons (French speaking) live in Wallonia and 
form the majority in Brussels (80%).17 
Established in 1830,  the Belgian State has long been governed centrally from its 
capital  Brussels,  the  official  language  being French.  After  the  First  World  War,  the 
"Flemish  movement"  began  to  play  a  significant role,  first  at  the  cultural  level  and 
subsequently at the political and economic level.I8 For example, in 1932 a law declared 
Flanders and Wallonia as essentially uni-lingual regions, whereas Brussels was officially 
recognized  as  bi-lingual.  In  1960,  a  political  federalization  process  was  introduced, 
granting  some  political  autonomy  to  the  Flemish  and  the  Walloon  communities 
(Beaufays,  1998). Due to  differences in income and economic growth between the two 
groups, part of the current debate concentrates on economic issues, such as the power to 
levy taxes at the regional level and to construct independent social security systems.19 
17  Using the language criterion, some 60% of the population may thus be categorised as Flemish, whereas 
some  40%  of the  population may  be  categorised  as  Walloon.  Note that  there  is  also  a small  German 
speaking minority  in the East of Belgium (in  the  region of Wallonia,  amounting  to  about 0.6%  of the 
population) 
18 There has not been a parallel Walloon movement with the same influence, see e.g. Van Dam (1998). 
19  The  debate  follows  from  the  different  economic  conditions,  which  have  resulted  in  transfers  from 
Flanders to  Wallonia.  For example,  income per employed person is  some  7%  percent higher in Flanders 
than  in Wallonia,  whereas  income  per capita  is  some  13%  higher  (Dexia,  2001).  These  figures  reflect 
differences in participation and unemployment rates. 
12 Research  on  group  identity conducted by Maddens  et al.  (1997)  indicates that 
while the Flemish strongly identify with their region,  the  Walloons tend to  feel  strong 
affiliation with the Belgian State. 
3.2. Experimental Procedure 
The  participants  in  this  experiment  consisted  of 302  Belgian  undergraduates 
students.2o The participants in the role of Student A were recruited in their classes from 
two  catholic  universities:  the  University  of Leuven  (a  Flemish  university)  and  the 
University of Louvain-La-Neuve (a Walloon university). The participants in the role of 
Student B were recruited from two other catholic universities: the University of Antwerp 
(Flemish) and the University of Namur (Walloon). The experiment was conducted at the 
beginning  of  the  class  and  took  about  15  minutes.  After  the  class  instructor  had 
introduced the experimenter, the experimenter presented a short verbal introduction. In 
this  introduction  the experimenter told the  participants  that  they were  being asked to 
participate in a short experiment that would take about 15  minutes, and that they would 
be paid according to the instructions given. After that the experiment's instructions were 
distributed (see Appendix 1 for an English translation of the instructions). 
In the  instructions the  participants in  the role  of Student A  were told that the 
experiment was conducted in pairs and that they would be matched with a Student B from 
another university. The name of the other university was our experimental treatment. One 
third  of the  students  were  told  that the other participant  was  from  the  University of 
20  It is interesting to  note that Bouckaert and Dhaene (2002) did not find  discrimination in a trust game 
experiment with Turkish origin and Belgium origin smail business managers in Belgium. 
13 Antwerp (a Flemish university); another third was told that the other participant was from 
the  University  of Namur  (a  Walloon  university);  the  rest  were  told  that  the  other 
participant was  from  a different Belgian  university.  Player A was  infonned that (s)he 
would receive  BEF 2,00021  and that hislher partner (Player B)  would not receive any 
money. Player A was then asked to decide if (s)he wanted to transfer any portion of the 
BEF 2,000 to  Player B  and if so,  how  much~ The  players  were  told that the  amount 
transferred would automatically be tripled by the experimenters and that Player B,  with 
whom they were matched,  would be informed about all  details pertaining to the game, 
including the amount that Player A transferred to himlher within a few days.  Player B 
would then be asked to decide whether (s)he wanted to send any portion of the money 
(s)he  had  received  back  to  Player  A.  The  students  were  told  that  this  last  transfer 
concluded the experiment and that we would come to their classes one week later to pay 
them. They were also advised that only lout of 50 students will be paid, and that this 
student will be chosen at random?2 Each player A was then asked to write down his (her) 
name and the amount (s)he wanted to transfer to Player B. 
After  the  students  had  filled  in  their  choices,  we  collected  the  fonns  and 
distributed a questionnaire.  After we  had collected the questionnaires  we  thanked  the 
students and repeated that we will return next week to pay them. 
In the second stage of the experiment, we similarly approached the students taking 
the role of player B from the University of Antwerp and the University of Namur. The 
same type of verbal introductions was  given to  the students,  and then the instructions 
21  At the time of  the experiment, $1= BEF 43.5. 
14 were  handed  to  the  students  (see  Appendix  I  for  the  English  translation  of  the 
instructions to Player B). The students were provided with exactly the same description of 
the experiment. They were also informed of the university of Player A,  with whom they 
were matched (apart from the "Belgium" group), as well as of the sum (s)he had decided 
to forward to  them.  After filling  in  the questionnaires,  lout of 50 students  was paid 
confidentially and in cash?3 
Table 1 presents the number of pairs that were matched according to their origin 
from a Flemish or Walloon university. 
Student B 
Flemish  Walloon 
Flemish  23  28 
Student A 
Walloon  29  22 
Table 1: The number of matched couples according to the University of  Player A and of  Player B. 
The third  group represents the  students who  were  told that they were matched 
with a "Belgian" counterpart. Table 2 presents the number of pairs in which the students 
(Student A and Student B) were not told in which Belgian university hislher counterpart 
22  We chose to pay only lout of 50 students because we wanted the amounts of money to be substantial. 
See for example Bolle (1990) for  the argument that paying large amounts of money with low probability is 
better than paying small amounts of money for certain. 
23  The same experimenter conducted all  parts of the experiment.  We purposefully chose a non-Belgian 
experimenter in order not to bias the results in any direction. For that reason, the verbal introductions were 
given in English at all sites. The written instructions were, however, translated into the local languages: 
Dutch for the Flemish students and French for the Walloon students. This was done because some students 
may have insufficient knowledge of English, especially in the Walloon universities. The translation was 
15 studies  (note  that  they  were  also  told  that  this  student  was  NOT  from  their  own 
university). 
Student B 
Flemish  Walloon 
Flemish  13  12 
Student A 
Walloon  12  12 
Table 2: The number of matched couples according to the university of  Player A and of  Player B. Note: 
these students did not know the university of their counterpart but only that (s)he was from another 
university in Belgium. 
3.3. Results: Discrimination Against 
The outcome of the experiment is described in the following two figures. Figure 1 
displays the distribution of money transfers by Flemish students, who were assigned as 
players A,  to Flemish, Walloons and anonymous players with whom they were matched. 
Figure 2 displays the distribution of transfers given by Walloon students (player A)  to 
Flemish, Walloons and anonymous students. These distributions provide direct evidence 
for the degree of ethnic segmentation in Belgian society. In particular, note that more than 
40% of the Walloon students sent the full  amount of BEF 2000 when they played with 
Walloon students. They thus achieved an efficient transfer and maximized the size of the 
pie.  However,  less  than  10%  of the Walloon  students  chose  this  strategy  when  they 
played with a Flemish student. Similarly, about 13% of the Flemish students sent the full 
amount  when  they  played  with  Flemish  students,  whereas  only  4%  of the  Flemish 
completed by people who  know  all  three languages  (English,  French and Dutch)  and  speak  the  local 
16 students sent the full amount when they played with the Walloon students. Consequently, 
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17 Figure 2: Amounts sent by Players A From a Walloon University 
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Observation 1 (Group Bias): Belgian society is characterized by significant group bias. 
Both Walloon and Flemish students transferred significantly larger amounts to players of 
their  own  ethnic  group.  The  average  transfer  of Flemish  students  to  other  Flemish 
students was BEF 1009 while the average transfer to Walloon students was BEF 536. The 
average  transfer  of Walloon  students  to Walloon  students  was  BEF 1200,  while  the 
average transfer to Flemish students was BEF 745. An analysis of variance shows that the 
differences are  significant (F(1,51)=1O.85,  P=0.002 in the first case;  and F(1,51)=5.85, 
P=0.019 in the second case).24 
24 We report the ANOV  A test results, which is the standard analysis based on the normality assumption. In 
Appendix 2, we also report the Mann-Whitney U test results, which is a nonparametric test based on rank. 
The results of the tests are similar in all cases. 
18 In order to classify the type of discrimination found in Belgian society, we now 
compare the transfers made to the anonymous players to the transfers made to players 
with identified ethnic affiliations. 
Observation 2  <Discrimination  Against):  The  transfers  made  by  Flemish players  to 
anonymous players (average transfer of BEF 1050) were not significantly different from 
the transfers they made to Flemish players (average transfer of BEF 1010) (F(1,48)=.06, 
P=0.81O).  Similarly,  the  transfers  made  by  Walloon  players  to  anonymous  players 
(average transfer of BEF 1120)  were not significantly different from  the transfers they 
made to the  Walloon players  (average transfer  of BEF  1200)  (F(I,53)=.18, P=O.677). 
Thus,  the  ethnic  discrimination  in  Belgium  can  be  characterized  as  "discrimination 
against" members of the different group. 
Larger transfers, indicating trust, increase the  overall pie to be  divided between 
the players while mistrust reduces the total surplus. But such mistrust can be consistent 
with payoff maximization if player A believes that Player B will not share her gains. In 
order to consider this possibility,  we examined the returns of Players  B to Players  A, 
depending on the players ethnic affiliation. That is, were the returns of Walloon (Flemish) 
players back to Flemish (Walloon) players sufficiently low to justify the low transfers 
received in the  first stage of the game? If these transfers are sufficiently small, that is, 
they are less than the original amount transferred from Player A to Player B, then we can 
indeed  say  that  the  discrimination  practiced  by  Players  A  is  consistent  with  payoff 
maximization. In this analysis, we only consider the returns on sufficiently large transfers; 
19 smaller transfers may be associated with  a lack of trust and thus  may lead to  negative 
payoffs. 
Observation 3:  Considering the returns to  students  who had sent at least BEF 
1500 to their partner, we find that Flemish students obtained an  average returns of 19% 
on the amount they had transferred to other Flemish students, and a return of 54% on the 
amount transferred to Walloon students. Similarly, Walloon students received an average 
return of 17% on amounts transferred to Flemish students, and an average return of 48% 
on amounts sent to other Walloon students. Thus students had on the average a positive 
return  on  the  transfers  they  made  to  other students  including to  students  from  other 
groups.  We thus can conclude that within the context of our experiment, mistrust and 
small transfers reflect a taste for discrimination. 
The direct economic implication of such discrimination is a smaller overall surplus. In 
Table 3 we indicate the overall payoffs of both players, depending on the players' type. It 
is easy to observe that the overall surplus is maximized when both players are of the same 
ethnic group. 
20 Student B (receiver) 
Flemish  Walloon  Total (weighted 
average) 
Flemish  4017  3071  3498 
Student A 
(sender)  Walloon  3491  4400  4008 
Total  3760  3747  3753 
Table 3: Average total payoffs to Players A and B (minimum payoff is BEF 2000; maximum is BEF 6000). 
While  our  main  concern  in  this  experiment  was  to  ascertain  the  effect  of 
anonymity,  we  were surprised to observe a systematic difference between the amounts 
transferred by students of the two ethnic groups. 
Observation 4:  (i) Flemish players transferred significantly smaller amounts than did 
Walloon players. The average transfer by Flemish players to Flemish and Walloon players 
was BEF 749. ill comparison, the average transferred by Walloon players to Flemish and 
Walloon players was BEF 1004. The difference is significant (F(1,102)=4.16, P=0.044). 
(ii)  The economic  consequence of such  behavior is  transparent  (see  Table  3).  When 
Player A was Flemish the overall payoffs of both players were on the average BEF 3498 
while when player A was Walloon the overall payoffs of both players was BEF 4008. 
4. Nepotism. 
We now move to consider the (ultra-orthodox) religious - secular segmentation in 
Israel.  As  will  be shown the  discriminatory behavior expressed by  the  ultra-orthodox 
minority in Israel is quite different in character. 
21 4.1 A Short Background on (Jewish) Religious-Secular Segmentation in Israel 
The  ultra-orthodox  Jewish  population  is  a  rather  small  and relatively  isolated 
group consisting of approximately 9%  of the  Israeli population.  Most members  of this 
group  reside  in  segregated  neighborhoods  in  the  country's  main  cities  but  are 
concentrated in Jerusalem and Bnei-Brak (a city close to  Tel  Aviv  and the only city in 
Israel having an ultra-orthodox Jewish majority). Ultra-orthodox Jews do not participate 
in  the  Zionist  movements;  they  maintain  their  own  political  parties  that  send 
representatives  to  Israel's  Parliament.  Although  there  are  some  exceptions,  the  ultra-
orthodox  do  not  serve  in  the  Israeli  army  and  attempt  to  avoid  compulsory  military 
service. This behavior has become a major political issue and a source of resentment and 
tension between secular and religious groups. As a community, ultra-orthodox Jews are 
divided  among  themselves  into  different  subgroups  that  reflect  their  members' 
geographic origin in the Diaspora, the rabbis and the theological schools they follow etc. 
We ignore these distinctions in this work despite their occasionally meaningful effects on 
intra-communal relations. 
Part  of the  system  of segregation  between  the  ultra-orthodox  and  the  secular 
Jewish  population  is  their  separate  school  system,  extending  from  nursery  school  to 
college.  This  segregation  enables  us  to  use  schools  as  a  signaling  devise  in  our 
experiment. 
4.2 Experimental procedure 
22 The  participants  in  this  experiment  were  Israeli  undergraduate  students.  The 
participants in the role of Student A were recruited in their classes from an ultra-orthodox 
college in Jerusalem. The participants in  the role of Player B were recruited from two 
other colleges in Israel: The Academic College of Tel-Aviv (a secular institution), and the 
ultra-orthodox college in Ashdod. The experiment was conducted during a class and took 
about 15 minutes. Mter the instructor introduced the experimenter, the experimenter gave 
a short verbal introduction. The introduction and instruction were identical to the Belgian 
treatment except for minor locally determined details such as  the sums that were given. 
After that the instructions for  the  experiment were distributed (see Appendix  1 for  an 
English translation of the instructions. Payoffs were in NIS,  with player A offered NIS 
200, then equivalent to about BEF 2,000). 
In the instructions, the participants in the role of Student A were likewise told that 
the  experiment would be  conducted in  pairs  and that they  would be matched  with  a 
Student  B,  from  another  college.  Although  the  name  of the  other  college  was  our 
experimental treatment, some variation was introduced. In the first treatment, we told the 
students  that  the  other  participant  was  from  the  Academic  College  of Tel-Aviv.  To 
another group, we stated that the other participant was from the ultra-orthodox college in 
Ashdod.  The  third  group  was  told  that  Player  B  was  either  from  the  ultra-orthodox 
college  in  Ashdod  or  from  the  Academic  College  of  Tel-Aviv,  each  with  a  50% 
probability. Finally, the participants in the fourth group were told that their counterparts 
were  from another college  in  Israel.  The  rest of the procedure was identical to  that of 
Belgium experiment. 
23 Table 4 presents the number of pairs that were matched according to the origin of 
player B. 
Student B 
Ultra- Secular  Anonymous  Anonymous 
orthodox  50:50 
I  Student A I  Ultra- orthodox  28  22  26  28 
Table 4:  The number of matched couples according to the type  of college attended by 
Player B and the information given about him to Player A. 
4.3 Results 
The distribution of the sums transferred by ultra-orthodox players is provided in 
Figure 3. The four columns describe the four different types of students who took the role 
of player B. The first column describes the transfers to other ultra- orthodox players, the 
second the  transfers  to  the  secular players,  the  third  to  anonymous  players  from  the 
general population, while the fourth column refers to transfers to anonymous players who 
were  either  from  the  ultra-orthodox  college  or  from  the  Tel  Aviv  secular  college 
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Figure 3: Amounts sent by  Players A from an ultra-orthodox 
college 
L=ltntru 
I  I 
D n.n  n  I  I  I  I d 
o  20  40  60  80  100  120  140  160  180  200 
Amount sent 
•  Ultra-orthodox •  Secular 0 Anonymous  Q Anonymous 50-50 
Observation  5:  The  behavior  of the  ultra-orthodox  Jews  can  be  characterized  as 
nepotistic behavior. The average amount of NIS 94.1  they transferred to secular players 
does not differ significantly from the average amount of NIS 95 transferred to anonymous 
players (F(1,48)=.00, P=0.965) or from  the average amount of NIS  99.6 transferred to 
anonymous players displaying a 50% probability of being another ultra-orthodox student 
(F(I,50)=.08,  P=O.779).  At  the same time,  the  amount they transferred to other ultra-
orthodox  students  (which  averaged  133.2)  was  significantly  higher  (F(I,50)=4.30, 
P=O.044). 
The  roughly  equal  average  transfers  to  secular  and  anonymous  players  and  the 
significantly higher average transfers to ultra-orthodox players might still be attributed to 
the  fact  that  secular  players  represent  the  majority  of Jewish  society,  so  that  the 
25 probability of an  anonymous player being secular is high.  Based on this alone,  one can 
only conclude that some form of discrimination is operating, without being clear whether 
it concerns  discrimination  against  or  nepotism.  However,  in  the treatment  where the 
anonymous player is secular with only a 50% probability, transfers were insignificantly 
different from the transfers to the secular players. This implies that the discrimination is 
clearly of the nepotistic, favoring their own ultra-orthodox group. 
Similar  to  the  Belgium  experiment,  we  tested  whether  the  transferred  sums 
returned by ultra-orthodox players  B to ultra-orthodox  players A  are sufficiently large 
relative to the returns of secular players to justify the larger transfers received by the ultra-
orthodox in the first stage of  the game. 
Observation 6:  Considering the returns to students who sent at least NIS  150,  we find 
that  ultra-orthodox  students  obtained  an  average  return  of 40%  on the  amount  they 
transferred  to  other  ultra-orthodox  students,  and  a  return  of  29%  on  the  amount 
transferred to secular students. This difference is not significant. We can thus conclude 
that,  in our experiment,  the mistrust  and the low transfers  to  secular students  are not 
consistent with payoff maximization and reflect nepotistic preferences. 
5. Concluding Remarks. 
We have presented an experimental test to distinguish between the two extreme 
cases of discrimination in segmented societies: nepotism and discrimination against. We 
found  evidence of nepotism in the  Israeli  society,  and  of discrimination against in the 
26 Belgian  society.  Our results  have  implications for  the  efficiency of anti-discrimination 
measures,  application of the  anonymity rule in particular. In our setting cooperation is 
desirable; hence, discrimination against should be discouraged through anonymity rules, 
and nepotism encouraged as it increases the total surplus. It should be clear, however, that 
in  a  reverse  situation  where  cooperation  is  socially  harmful  (e.g.,  collusion  between 
agents in organizations), nepotism should be discouraged through anonymity rules, rather 
than encouraged. 
An important question is why we have such different patterns of discrimination in 
different societies. The paper does not provide any answer to this question. Since we put 
the students in both experiments in  an identical situation, the experiment itself does not 
provide any clue as to why nepotism appears in one society and discrimination against in 
the other. However, there are two  important differences between the two societies that 
may explain our findings (other than the obvious cultural and geographical differences). 
In the Belgian example, people from each group live within a more or less homogeneous 
territory  (with  the  exception  of the  Brussels  area),  while  in  Israel,  there  is  more 
geographical dispersion. Moreover, in Belgium the two groups are roughly of the same 
size  while  in  Israel  the  ultra-orthodox  group  is  a  small  minority.  Although  in  the 
experiment itself the students were in an identical situation, their conceptual frameworks 
might be different. It  is possible that because of the above differences, the Belgian student 
accepts  the possibility that  an  anonymous  person belongs to his own  linguistic  group, 
while the ultra orthodox Jewish student's rejects the possibility of similarity and assumes 
that the anonymous other is probably a secular person. Although the experiment corrected 
for such a bias by introducing a treatment where the probabilities of an anonymous player 
27 being secular player is only 50%, the students' perceptions and their behaviour may still 
have been affected by their daily life experiences. 
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31 Appendix 1: Instructions for Player A 
Welcome  to  this  experiment  in  decision-making.  The  interaction  in  the 
experiment  will  be  in pairs  of students.  You  are  student  A  and the  student  you  are 
matched with is student B. 
The participants in the role of student B are from the University of XXX. 
At the beginning of the experiment you will receive BEF 2,000 but student B will 
not receive any money.  You are being asked to  decide whether you want to send any  of 
the amount given to you to the student you are matched with; and if so, how much would 
you  want to  send (this  amount must be in  multiples  of BEF 100).  We  will triple the 
amount you send  and  give it to  student B;  that is,  for  every  BEF 100  that you  send, 
student B will receive BEF 300. 
In a few  days  from now, we  will ask student B to decide if (s)he wants to send 
back to you any amount of the money (s)he has received (which will be three times the 
amount you sent); and if so, how much. This amount must be in multiples of 100 BEF 
and will not be tripled. 
Student B's decision will end the experiment. We will then randomly choose one 
pair  of students out of every  100  pairs.  This  pair  will  be paid during  the  next class 
according to the payment schedule described above. 
Your name: ______  _ 
The amount of money you want to  send to  student B: ______  (Please remember 
that this amount should be between BEFO and BEF2,000.) 
32 Instructions for Player B 
Welcome  to  this  experiment  in  decision-making.  The  interaction  in  the 
experiment will be conducted by pairs of students. You are student B and the student you 
are matched with is student A. 
The participants in the role of student A are from the University of XXX. 
A few  days ago, student A, with whom you are matched, has received BEF 2,000. 
Then (s)he was asked to decide whether (s)he wants to send any amount out of this sum 
to_you; and if so, how much (s)he wanted to send (this amount must be in multiples of 
BEF 100). We told student A that the amount sent would be tripled and given to you; that 
is, for every BEF 100 that student A sent, you will receive BEF 300. 
We  now ask you  to decide if you want to  send back to  the student A you are 
matched with any amount out of the sum you received (which is three times the amount 
student A sent); and if so, how much. This amount must be in multiples of BEF 100 and 
will not be tripled. 
Your decision will end the experiment. We will then randomly choose one pair of 
students out of every 100 pairs. This pair will be paid during the next class according to 
the above description. 
Your name: _____  _ 
The  amount  of  money  you  received  (what  student  A  sent  you  multiplied  by 
3):. ___  _ 
The  amount  of money  you  want  to  send  back  to  student  A:  (Please 
remember that this amount should be between BEF 0 and the amount you received) 
33 Appendix 2. Statistical tests 
Table. Differences between transfers for various treatments. Averages and Significance Tests 
Relating to  Transfer 1  Transfer 2  Average  Anova t-test  Mann-Whitney 
Observation  transfer  U-test 
from  to  from  to  difference  F-test  P  Z-test  P 
1  F  F  F  W  473  F(1,51)=10.85  .002  z=3.260  .001 
1  W  W  W  F  455  F(l,51)=5.85  .019  z=1.878  .060 
2  F  F  F  An  - 39  F(1,48)=.06  .810  z=-.223  .824 
2  W  W  W  An  83  F(l,53)=.18  .677  z=.424  .672 
4  F  F,W  W  F,W  -255  F(1,102)=4.16  .044  z=-2.068  .039 
5  U  S  U  U  -39.1  F(l,50)=4.30  .044  z=-1.938  .053 
5  U  S  U  An  -0.9  F(1,102)=.00  .965  z=-.126  .900 
5  U  S  _  U  AnSO%  -5.5  F(1,102)=.08  .779  z=-.249  .803 
Notes: The comparison IS between "Transfer 1" and 'Transfer 2", and fol1ows the order of  the diSCUSSion 1D 
the text. For Observations 1-4 the averages refer to BEFs. For Observation 5, the averages refer to NlS. 
F=F1emish, W=Walloon, An=Anonymous, U=illtra-orthodox Jew, S=SecuJar Jew, AnSO%=Anonymous 
with a 50% specification. 
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